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Abstract—This paper aims to discuss the recent trends in
the regulation of telecom services regarding the diffusion of
broadband. To this matter, it compares the recent interna-
tional competition regulation experiences to the Brazilian sce-
nario. Considering that the telecom sector passed through
huge technological and structural transformations in the last
decades (from typical voice communications to convergent ser-
vices based on broadband, and from voice services monopoly
to multiple services oligopoly), its regulatory framework has
also changed. Lately, several countries – such as the United
States, the Netherlands, Korea and Chile – have established
inter and intra-platform competition regulations in order to
expand the access to the new forms of communications based
on broadband. In Brazil, such mechanisms are not fully ex-
plored, and the country has lots of areas in which there is no
competition in broadband services (known as multimedia com-
munication services). As a result, Brazil has one of the highest
prices of broadband services and one of the lowest levels of
broadband penetration. In this way and considering interna-
tional success in expanding services through competition, the
paper defends that such mechanisms should be reinforced in
the Brazilian broadband market.
Keywords—Brazil, broadband, competition regulation, interna-
tional experiences.
1. Introduction
The recent changes in telecommunication sector, such as
liberalization, privatization and convergence, brought sev-
eral challenges to policy makers. The recognition that
the growing importance and essentiality of broadband has
changed the socio-economic dynamics of countries made
governments to change their regulatory agendas in order to
introduce mechanisms to stimulate broadband diffusion.
Based on this, the competitive regulatory mechanisms have
been introduced in the broadband markets in order to re-
duce the monopoly power of incumbents and to promote
the expansion and modernization of broadband infrastruc-
ture mainly to unserved areas. Lately, these regulatory
mechanisms are applied in order to encourage intra and
inter-platform competitions.
This paper aims to discuss these regulatory measures and
their effective impacts in the diffusion of broadband in se-
lected international experiences and in Brazil. Section 2
discusses the recent transformations that have happened in
the telecom sector, stressing the important role of broad-
band as a subject of central appeal in the telecom reg-
ulatory agendas. Section 3 shows how these transforma-
tions mentioned in the first section have affected the pat-
tern of competition in telecom sector, introducing intra and
inter-platform competition, and how these kinds of com-
petition affect broadband diffusion. Section 4 presents the
experiences of the USA, the Netherlands, Korea and Chile
in competition-based regulation and broadband diffusion.
Finally, Section 5 presents the Brazilian case, showing the
differences in patterns of competition in the broadband mar-
kets of its different regions, and how these differences are
correlated to the diffusion of broadband. The Conclusion
presents the major achievements of the paper and points
some possible measures to be applied in the Brazilian
scenario.
2. Recent Changes in Telecom Sector
Over the past two decades, the telecom sector has been
shaken by huge transformations. One is related to the
sector’s liberalization and privatization processes that took
place around the world. These processes have accelerated
the movement of global mergers and acquisitions, especially
by developed countries searching for scale gains. The other
important change that took place in this sector was the dig-
italization of telecom networks. This innovation gave rise
to Next Generation Networks (NGN) that integrate the ex-
isting separate voice and data network into an easier and
more flexible network mainly using Internet Protocols (IP).
So, these NGN are chiefly based on new platforms such as
broadband Internet, 3G mobile networks, wireless LANs
and digital televisions [1].
This digitalization of telecom networks provides a conver-
gence of services and technologies – enabling a single net-
work to carry a range of voice, audiovisual and data trans-
mission services – modifying the patterns of competition
and innovation among firms and countries, and blurring
traditional boundaries in a large range of telecom services.
Besides, it is important to stress that this revolution in in-
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formation and telecommunication technologies (ICT) has
also induced major social changes related to forms of com-
munication and information access1.
The digitalization of telecommunication networks is in-
creasingly extending the limits of this industry, previously
restricted to equipment and services for voice transmission.
Beyond the rapid spread of mobile telephone services since
the 1990s, the increasing speed of technological conver-
gence tends to incorporate different types of media and
data services for communication networks. Furthermore,
the disseminated use of uploads and downloads requiring
higher bandwidths transforms broadband Internet access
into an indispensable resource for accessing information
today.
In this context, there is growing public concern related
to the generalization of availability and access to these
new forms of communication, especially in the remote ar-
eas and/or to low income populations, which could not
be supplied only by the private sector. The most common
networks to provide broadband access to the mentioned
forms of communication are traditional telecommunica-
tions access networks, through the ADSL technology, and
the cable TV networks, using different versions of coaxial
cables.
Based on this most common market structure, regulatory
measures focused on stimulate competition between opera-
tors have been explored by regulators all around the world
in order to expand broadband infrastructure and services.
These competitive regulatory measures are analyzed in the
next section.
3. Competition in the Broadband
Market
Technological and structural changes that took place in tele-
com sector in the latest decades have changed the kind of
regulatory interventions in the market. Previously, compet-
itive stimulus between telecom operators was conceived as
inefficient, facing the duplication of networks, and as an
obstacle to the expansion of infrastructure investments [5].
But, since the market liberalization and the technological
and services convergence processes, competition has been
seen as an important mechanism for the diffusion of tele-
com services, especially of broadband, once it allows costs
reduction and increase of penetration rates.
There are two major forms of competition between tele-
com operators: service-based competition (or intra-plat-
form competition) that is known as the competition be-
tween entrants and the incumbent in a single network with
regulated access, and platform-based competition (or inter-
platform competition) known as the competition between
different kinds of infrastructure for the provision of ser-
vices [6], [7]).
1Indeed, there is vast economic literature addressing the interpretation
and consequences of the ICT Revolution in socio-economic development.
An interesting discussion on this issue from an evolutionary perspective
is presented by [2]–[4].
The classical example of a platform-based competition is
the competition between cable TV operators, providing
content, broadband and telephony services, and telecom
operators, providing the same kind of services. In this
way, the promotion of platform-based competition depends
on the level of encouragement supported by the regulator
in order to attract investments in alternative networks than
the already established in a telecom market.
According to Katz [8], the advantages of platform-based
competition are that, because it occurs between companies
with their own different infrastructures, it promotes a mul-
tidimensional form of competition (in price, service and
quality), and it stimulates each operator to invest and to in-
novate in their own networks. In the same way, Prado [9]
affirms that the advantages of platform-based competition
are the promotion of the expansion and of the moderniza-
tion of the operator’s networks, leading to the cheapening
of the technological solutions.
The classical example of the service-based competition is
the competition between entrants (telecom operators that
do not have their own networks, and that, because of this,
rent a portion of the incumbent’s network) and incumbents
through the same platform but providing different services.
This kind of competition has emerged after the convergence
advent. The major regulatory mechanisms applied to guar-
antee service-based competition are: network interconnec-
tion, unbundling, wholesale and structural/functional sepa-
ration.
The network interconnection is the connection of compat-
ible telecom networks in order to provide communication
or service access between users of different networks. The
unbundling is the mechanism by which telecom operators
are able to buy or rent portions of incumbent’s networks
to provide services to their own subscribers. The whole-
sale is the mechanism by which telecom operators are able
to acquire network services, by wholesale prices, to re-
sale in retail. Through the structural separation between
services and platforms (also known as functional separa-
tion), the company that owns the infrastructure is prevented
from offering services, in order to avoid vertical integration.
Finally, through the structural separation between services,
the regulator determines the establishment of different busi-
ness units to a unique telecom operator. In such a way, in-
cumbents that own fixed telephony networks should only
offer telephony services, and not internet access services,
for example2. All of these regulatory mechanisms aim at
avoiding anticompetitive behaviors based on the histori-
cal market power of the incumbents. The major advan-
tage of the promotion of service-based competition is the
diminishing of the incumbents’ market power through the
provision of the access for the entrants to the already estab-
lished networks (especially through the unbundling mech-
anism). But, according to Bourreau and Dogan [10], al-
though it stimulates competition within existing networks,
2This kind of mechanism is rarely used because, by essence, it goes
against the convergence trend of telecom sector.
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service-based competition could discourage investments in
the expansion of alternative networks.
In this way, contrary to the situation of a platform-based
competition – that satisfies the objective of the dynamic ef-
ficiencies (such as the stimulus in investments in infrastruc-
ture and in innovation) [8] – in a service-based competition
situation, this stimulus is much lower since competitors (en-
trants) benefit from investments made by networks owners
(incumbents).
As one can imagine, competition between telecom opera-
tors has an important role on broadband diffusion. Inter-
national experiences show that platform-based competition
has been responsible for the expansion of broadband access
to Internet, especially between cable and ADSL platforms.
The next section shows some international experiences of
how the regulatory competitive mechanisms are increasing
broadband penetration rates.
4. Experiences of Competition
and Broadband Penetration
Policies and regulations concerning the diffusion of broad-
band vary among the world’s leading ICT countries. How-
ever, there is now consensus regarding the growing im-
portance of the role of government in the promotion of
a competition-based regulation.
With regard to broadband diffusion, empirical research em-
phasizes that inter-platform competition drives broadband
adoption, while intra-platform competition in DSL is esti-
mated to play a less significant role. The benefits of un-
bundling are emphasized for countries with a lack of alter-
native infrastructure, like some Member States of European
Union, and less broadband penetration.
As it is presented in this section, DSL and cable are the two
most common broadband access technologies nowadays.
DSL is by far the dominant broadband access technology
in the majority of the cases, with exception of the United
States of America. Furthermore, cases show that facility-
based competition is, lately, considered by regulators the
most effective mechanism to promote broadband diffusion,
mainly due to the fact that this kind of competition leads
to decreases in prices and to stimulus in investments in the
infrastructure expansion and modernization.
4.1. The case of the United States of America
According to Denni and Gruber [11], in the case of the
USA, in the beginning of United States Market liberaliza-
tion, regulatory mandates towards interconnection and un-
bundling were established to reduce incumbent monopoly
power and to stimulate competition in order to increase the
provision of broadband services. Initially, intra-platform
competition seemed to have a positive impact only on the
rate of diffusion but then dissipates. So, the outputs ob-
tained in terms of increasing of broadband penetration rates,
new investments and innovation were bellow than expected.
Based on this fact, in 2003, the FCC reoriented its policy
priorities towards equal access conditions to networks in-
cumbent wireline firms reducing the regulatory effort and in
favour of investment incentives that promote inter-platform
competition. Two years later, the FCC decided to deregu-
late the US broadbandmarket totally, eliminating regulatory
tariffs and unbundling obligations, allowing mergers and
acquisitions, and reinforcing inter-platform competition.
Nowadays, competition in the US broadband market is hap-
pening almost exclusively between telecommunications and
cable operators and it is stimulating new investments on the
expansion of infrastructure and on innovation. As positive
results derived from the stimulus to inter-platform com-
petition in the US, the following are [8] the diminishing
of 80% in the broadband services prices between 2001 to
2005 (from USD 80.00 per month to USD 15.00 per month
on average) and the increasing of the offered average speed.
Moreover, data from ITU show that from 2003 (mark of the
beginning of encouragement of inter-platform competition
in the US) to 2010, the penetration of broadband services
had a significant increasing of 190%, from 9.5% to 27.6%
(as shown in Table 1).
So, it is possible to consider that in the US experience the
inter-platform competition had a much more important role
in driving the rate of diffusion for the longer term, and the
US model of inter-platform competition was considered the
basis for this kind of competition in the world [8].
However, as considered by Picot and Wernick [7], by rely-
ing solely on the benefits of platform competition, the US
is pursuing a different path than Korea and Europe. De-
spite its attempts in spurring the broadband development
by public initiatives on the local level, the role of the US
government in furthering broadband deployment can be in-
terpreted as rather passive. So, the passive role of the US
regulation with regard to supply- and demand-side activ-
ities linked with deregulatory efforts in market regulation
have furthered massive investments by incumbent operators
in NGN, but not yet succeeded in bridging the lack in rela-
tion to penetration rates in leading broadband economies.
4.2. The case of the Netherlands
As well as in the case of the USA, the broadband market
of the Netherlands has two major operators: telecommuni-
cations (KPN representing the major incumbent) and cable.
Regulation in the Netherlands is based on the rules related
to unbundling and open access, but the major form of com-
petition is inter-platform.
This competitive dynamic has encouraged operators to in-
crease their investments on infrastructure expansion, as well
as on the modernization of networks based on NGN ser-
vices, which allowed the Netherlands to achieve the highest
level of broadband penetration in the world (38%, in 2010,
as shown in Table 1).
Differently from the US broadband market – in which the
cable operator has the largest share (54%) – in the Nether-
lands, KPN is still dominant in the market (44%). This is
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Table 1
USA, Korea, Netherlands and Chile: Competition and impacts on broadband market
Country
Kind of competition
Market share
Broadband penetraton Monthly minimum broadband
encouraged rate (2010) price (USD PPP)
United States From Service-based Cable: 54% 27.6% USD 15.00
to Platform-based Telecom 1: 20%
Telecom 2: 12%
Korea Platform-based Telecom 1: 45% 35.7% USD 31.00
Telecom 2: 26%
Telecom 3: 10%
Cable: 19%
Netherlands Platform-based Telecom 1: 44% 38.1% USD 8.00
Cable: 39%
Chile From Service-based Telecom 1: 50% 10.5% USD 55.00
to Platform-based Cable: 40%
Source: [8], [13].
due to the fact that the incumbent has always been com-
mitted to invest on the modernization and expansion of its
networks, although obliged to share access of its infrastruc-
ture with entrants [8].
This situation of inter-platform competition combined to
increasing of investments from the both sides (telecom op-
erators and cable operators) has led to decreasing of prices
and increasing of broadband penetration rates. In relation
to prices, it is shown that the minimum monthly price of
broadband subscription in the Netherlands is USD 8.00
(PPP), one of the lowest prices in the world [8].
As one can notice, the Netherlands could be considered as
the best succeeded case of outputs of broadband based on
inter-platform competition.
4.3. The case of Korea
Based on the fact that in Korea the model of regulation
was focused on the encouragement of inter-platform com-
petition, as well as in the government intervention (through
the protection of national groups and the election of the
“national champions”), it is suggested that it is possible to
classify the case of Korea as a hybrid model of competition
regulation [8]. This model of “administered competition”
is responsible to transform Korea in one of the most im-
portant players of telecom sector in the world and, at the
same time, it has enabled the country to achieve one of the
highest levels of broadband penetration (35.7%, as shown
in Table 1).
The leading position of Korea has been furthered by plat-
form competition between DSL and cable modem [7].
While LLU played a negligible role, open access obliga-
tions for cable owners were important for new entrants to
compete on a playing field level.
In this way, platform competition between the incumbent,
KT (45% of market share, as shown in Table 1), offering
broadband by DSL, and Thrunet and Hanaro (26% of mar-
ket share, as shown in Table 1), being dependent on leasing
Cable TV networks, at least in the early phase after market
entry, contributed significantly to the launch of broadband
markets in Korea [12]. Lately, based on the sanction of reg-
ulator for the provision of bundled services (multiple ser-
vices packages), a price war has been established between
Korean major operators [8]. So, it is possible to notice that
inter-platform competition in Korea led to rapidly decreas-
ing price levels of broadband, which furthered broadband
adoption, as well as to the increasing of infrastructure ex-
pansion and modernization investments.
4.4. The case of Chile
As well as in the case of the US, in Chile, the regulator
has also reoriented its strategy towards the encouragement
of competition. After the liberalization of Chilean telecom
market, in 1990’s, regulatory measures, such as unbundling
and wholesale through the incumbent’s infrastructure
were used in order to promote intra-platform competition.
In 2004, the regulator proposed the adoption of the struc-
tural separation between services and platforms, a mecha-
nism that prohibits the operators that offer telecom services
to use their own infrastructure to this matter. This mech-
anism reinforced the option of Chilean regulation towards
the encouragement of intra-platform competition.
However, as it is presented in [8], from 2000 to 2005, the
level of infrastructure investments on broadband networks
dropped significantly. This fact influenced the Chilean reg-
ulator to change, in 2006, the regulation strategy towards
the encouragement of inter-platform competition. As one
can notice, the change of the regulatory orientation that
took place in Chile is the same that the one observed in
the US – from service-based competition to platform-based
competition.
Nowadays, the Chilean broadband market has two major
competitors: the incumbent operator, Telefonica, that is re-
sponsible for 50% of the broadband market, and the cable
operator, VTR, that is responsible for 40% of it (Table 1).
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Fig. 1. Selected countries: Broadband penetration rates (2010) [13].
Although close to a duopoly, the structure of Chilean broad-
band market has intense competition, what is confirmed by
important indicators, such as, penetration level of broad-
band (10.5%, as shown in Table 1 – the highest in Latin
America) and the drop of broadband prices (50%, from
2002 to 2008) [8].
5. The Brazilian Broadband Market
After the process of market liberalization that occurred
at the end of 1990’s, the General Telecommunications
Law [14] established some regulatory mechanisms in or-
der to stimulate competition between operators (such as
unbundling and interconnection obligations). After several
processes of mergers and acquisitions, today, three major
competitors are responsible for 80% of the provision of
multimedia communication services, i.e., broadband ser-
vices3. Oi, the major telecom incumbent, is responsible
for 34.4% of the market; NET, the major cable operator,
for 22.65%; and Telefonica, the telecom incumbent autho-
rized to explore the richest region of the country – the Sa˜o
Paulo state – is responsible for 21.77% of the market (see
Table 2).
Table 2
Market Shares of the majors multimedia communication
services providers in Brazil
Operator Market Share
Oi 34.4%
NET 22.65%
Telefonica 21.77%
Source: [15].
The Brazilian market structure is quite similar to those
of the cases mentioned above (the USA, the Netherlands,
3ANATEL, the Brazilian telecom sector regulator, determines that com-
panies interested in providing broadband services can only do so with the
authorization issued by ANATEL to explore the multimedia communica-
tion services.
Korea and Chile), and the kind of competition achieved,
inter-platform competition – between DSL and cable, is the
same as the successful cases indicate as the most effective
in broadband diffusion. So, why the Brazilian broadband
penetration level, prices and infrastructure investments are
one of the worst in the world?
Brazil has one of the smallest rates of broadband pen-
etration in the world (6.81%, in 2010, according ITU
database). It represents the 15th place in penetration rates
of Latin America (behind countries like Uruguay – 10.91%,
Chile – 10.45%, Mexico – 9.98%, Argentina – 9.56%, and
Panama – 7.84%), and it is far beyond the average of 24%
of broadband penetration in OECD countries (as shown
in Fig. 1).
Moreover, the Brazilian monthly prices of broadband sub-
scription are also one of the highest in the world. As shown
in Fig. 2, the relative price of broadband connection in
Brazil (the minimum basket of the service divided by GDP
per capita) is nine times higher than in the United States,
eight times higher than in Denmark and Switzerland, six
times higher than in Canada, five times higher than in Swe-
den, the Netherlands and Finland, four times higher than in
Japan and Germany, and three times higher than in Korea.
The broadband connection index in Brazil is even higher
than in some developing countries, such as Mexico and
Venezuela, but lower than in other developing countries
like India, Chile and Colombia.
However, as a country of continental size, with a huge range
of dispersion of income and population, it is important to
analyze the Brazilian case through the differences between
its regions. As shown in Table 3, the concentration ratio
(CR1) of the largest telecom company in each Brazilian
region is high, especially in North, Northeast and Center-
West regions. This means that the market power of a single
company is significantly high, which threatens competition
and, as a consequence, the diffusion of broadband.
In the North region, it is possible to observe the worst sit-
uation in terms of competition. The level of CR1 is higher
than 80%, which means that a single company, the tele-
com incumbent Oi, is responsible for almost the totality
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Fig. 2. Selected countries: Relation between broadband monthly
subscription cost and GDP per capita (2009) [16].
of the market. Besides the fact the Northern region is the
most concentrated broadband market of the country, the
predominant kind of competition is the intra-platform, or
service-based, competition (see Annex I). The exception
is the Amazonas state, in which it is possible to observe
inter-platform competition between the cable company NET
(52.52% of market share) and the telecom company Oi
(36.32% of market share). In this way, the North region
presents the lowest percentage of cities with broadband ac-
cess in the country (62%), and a level of penetration of
broadband services that is far below the Brazilian average
(3.75%) – comparable to the penetration levels of countries
like Peru (3.14%) and Suriname (2.99%) [13].
Table 3
Brazil: Broadband market by region
CR1 Broadband Cities with
Region [%] penetration broadband access
[%] [%]
North 83.2 3.75 61.7
Northeast 65.1 1.46 66.4
Center-West 63.9 6.97 96.6
South 47.8 8.27 90.5
Southeast 56.8 11.24 91.2
Source: [15], [17].
The situation of the Northeast region in terms of compe-
tition is similar to the one observed in the North region
and is highly concentrated. Oi, the largest company, has
65% of the Northeast market share; in almost half of the
Northeast states the largest company has more than 70%
of market share, and in one third of the Northeast states
the major kind of competition between telecom operators is
intra-platform (see Annex I). Because of this, the Northeast
region presents the worst level of broadband penetration in
the country (1.46%) – one of the lowest in the world –
and only 66.4% of the cities of this region have access to
broadband networks.
Although the Center-West region also presents a highly con-
centrated market structure (the largest company, Oi, has
64% of market share), the major form of competition be-
tween broadband companies is inter-platform, especially
between the telecom company – Oi and the cable com-
panies, GVT and NET. This situation has led to levels
of broadband infrastructure access and penetration in the
Center-West region that are above the Brazilian average
(96.6% and 6.97%, respectively).
Nevertheless, the best situations in the Brazilian broadband
market are presented in the South and Southeast regions.
In the South region, the level of broadband penetration is
about two percentage points higher than the average of the
country; the level of CR1 is below 50% (which represents
the best competitive situation of inter-platform competition
in the Brazilian broadband market – especially between
the telecom operator Oi, and the two cable companies,
NET and GVT), and the percentage of cities with access to
broadband infrastructure is higher than 90%.
Finally, it is possible to observe that, in terms of market
concentration, the Southeast has two major telecom com-
panies that dominate the market4: Telefonica, in Sa˜o Paulo
state, and Oi, in Rio de Janeiro state, Minas Gerais and
Espírito Santo that together have 56.8% of market share.
But, as well as observed in the South region, in the South-
east region there is also a strong inter-platform competi-
tion between these two telecom companies and the cable
companies NET and GVT (see Annex I). This strong pres-
ence of inter-platform competition has led the Southeast
region to achieve the highest level of broadband penetra-
tion in Brazil (11.24 %, comparable, for instance, to some
Latin American countries like Chile, 10.45%, and Uruguay,
10.91%, and to Russia, 10.98%) and the highest percent-
age of cities with broadband infrastructure access in the
country (91.2%).
As noticed in this section, although in the aggregate level
Brazil presents a situation of low level of concentration in
the structure of broadband market and inter-platform com-
petition (especially between telecom and cable companies),
4Based on the General Concession Plan [18], the country was divided
in regions to be explored by the private company utilities. Due to the
fact that Sa˜o Paulo state is the richest and most populated region of the
country, it was considered an isolated concession region, and Telefonica
won the concession to explore it. The concession to explore the other
states that compound the Southeast region (Rio de Janeiro state, Minas
Gerais and Espírito Santo) was won by Oi.
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the penetration rate of broadband is still low, even in com-
parison to other Latin American countries, and the prices
of broadband monthly subscription are one of the high-
est in the world. The low level of penetration and high
prices of broadband are the symptoms of a fragile com-
petitive structure. So, facing the fact that Brazil is a huge
country, with regions of different levels of density, income
and competition, this paper analyzed the different patterns
of competition between regions of the North, Northeast,
Center-West, South and Southeast, in order to explain the
country’s lag in a broadband diffusion.
As observed, in the North and Northeast regions – that
present high levels of CR1 and cases of intra-platform com-
petition – one can find the lowest levels of broadband pen-
etration and the lowest percentage of cities with access to
broadband infrastructure. On the other hand, in the Center-
West, South and Southeast regions, where inter-platform
competition and lower levels of CR1 are presented, one
can find the highest percentages of cities with access to
broadband infrastructure and levels of broadband penetra-
tion above the average of the country.
6. Conclusion
It is often claimed among practitioners and policy mak-
ers that broadband adoption can be stimulated more ef-
fectively by promoting competition between different plat-
forms (inter-platform competition), rather than focusing on
the market for DSL services (intra-platform competition).
The international cases and the analysis of Center-West,
South and Southeast Brazilian regions presented in this pa-
per can confirm such a claim.
The international experiences show that, although elected
in the early stages of telecom markets liberalization, the
regulatory mechanisms directed towards reducing incum-
bent’s market power (such as unbundling, interconnection,
wholesale and structural/functional separation) turned out
to be insufficient in promoting broadband diffusion, drop
in prices and infrastructure expansion and modernization.
Nevertheless, while platform competition seems to have
much impact on a high deployment rate, especially in
metropolitan areas, LLU can contribute to broadband diffu-
sion in regions and countries lacking of alternative infras-
tructure.
In the Brazilian case, in which broadband penetration dif-
fusion is far behind in comparison to several countries –
including countries in Latin America – the regional anal-
ysis confirmed that, in the regions where there is inter-
platform competition, higher levels of broadband diffusion
were achieved.
In this way, this paper states that the strengthening of reg-
ulatory and political measures towards the increasing of
inter-platform competition is mandatory in order to elim-
inate the digital divide between regions, as well as to in-
crease the level of broadband penetration of the country
as a whole.
Finally, it is important to stress that Brazilian hindrances
to the expansion of broadband penetration are much bigger
and more striking than those faced by developed countries,
such as: huge income concentration, educational and in-
struction shortcomings and unavailability of some essential
services in remote areas of the country.
Thus although public and regulatory initiatives appear to
be in line with those taken by some OECD countries, it
is necessary to consider that in the context of developing
countries like Brazil the government involvement in direct-
ing the private sector and in planning and implementing
wise public policies is of paramount importance to suc-
cessfully mitigating the digital divide, and to achieve real
conditions for broadband diffusion.
Appendix
Brazil: Broadband market structure
by region and state
NORTH REGION
States
Acre
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 93.28
Embratel DSL 2.93
Amazonas
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 52.52
Embratel DSL 36.32
Ampa´
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 67.95
Embratel DSL 24.15
Para´
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 87.59
Embratel DSL 6.93
Rondoˆnia
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 95.15
Embratel DSL 2.15
Roraima
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 92.54
Embratel DSL 6.74
Tocantins
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 93.02
Embratel DSL 1.97
NORTHEAST REGION
States
Maranha˜o
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 76.23
Embratel DSL 13.85
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Piauı´
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 88.47
Embratel DSL 5.34
Ceara´
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 57.63
GVT Cable 22.16
Videomar Radio 9.48
Rio Grande do Norte
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 87.59
Cabo Servic¸os de
Cable 6.93
Telecom ltda.
Paraiba
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 47.55
NET Cable 27.96
GVT Cable 13.47
Sergipe
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 84.32
Embratel DSL 4.34
Pernambuco
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 51.94
GVT Cable 31.12
Embratel DSL 4.66
Bahia
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 56.2
GVT Cable 16.08
Embratel DSL 4.17
CENTER-WEST REGION
States
Goia´s
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 55.84
GVT Cable 19.43
NET Cable 15.08
Mato Grosso
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 76.16
GVT Cable 14.62
Mato Grosso do Sul
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 59.59
NET Cable 15.30
GVT Cable 14.02
SOUTHEAST REGION
States
Minas Gerais
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 51.35
NET Cable 14.74
CTBC
Optical
11.75
Fiber
GVT Cable 5.82
Espı´rito Santo
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 51.59
GVT Cable 24.89
NET Cable 13.44
Rio de Janeiro
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 68.30
NET Cable 21.49
Sa˜o Paulo
Company Network Market share [%]
Telefonica DSL 55.87
NET Cable 33.31
SOUTH REGION
States
Parana´
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 38.37
GVT Cable 28.61
NET Cable 12.75
Santa Catarina
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 62.28
NET Cable 17.34
GVT Cable 12.24
Rio Grande do Sul
Company Network Market share [%]
Oi DSL 42.85
NET Cable 26.44
GVT Cable 18.03
Source: [18].
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